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Trade policy, and its effects oftariffs on structural change and industrialization, is arguably 
the 1110st contentious topic in Italian economic history. However, so far the discussion has 
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a comprehensive data-base of nominal and effective protection rates to test the main 
hypotheses put forward in the literature. We show that there is little evidence of a deliberate 
strategy to foster industrialization, or of any consisted strategy at aH. So we argue that the 
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notably the need for revenue and the lobbying by sectional interests. 
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1) Introduction: 
Trade policy has always been a controversial topic, because at least until the 1930s, protectionism 
was the main tool available to affect the allocation ofresources in the economy. Consequently, it has 
been subject ofextensive historical research.. In principIe, one could ask four different questions: 
a) how did the trade policy affect welfare? 
b) how did it affect the allocation of resources? 
c) how did it affect the distribution ofincome among owners ofthe factors (capital, labor, land) 
d) why was the policy adopted? 
The Italian case is no exception: the trade policy is arguably the most contentious topic in Italian 
economic history. The debate however has focused almost exelusively on the second question, 
whether protection did or did not contribute to structural change and industrialization. This feature is 
easy to understand. In fact Italy in the second half of the 19th century was still a backward country, 
way behind France, Germany or the USA in industrial development. Hence, its industry was 
supposed to need help from the state: the majority ofhistorians would agree that the government 
tried to provide at least sorne support. They however disagree on the outcomes oftrade policy. 
Opinions range from a tentative endorsement to a very stern criticismo Unfortunately, very seldom if 
ever, these statements are based on any sort ofquantitative test. Historians rely mainly on the 
opinions ofcontemporary economists, which ineluded sorne cursory quotation of duties, and, 
sometimes, on evidence ofchanges in the trade flows. Even the actuallevel of protection is largely 
unknown: there are very few estimates of nominal rates for selected products and one only attempt 
to compute effective protection rates e). 
Such a gap in knowledge has to be filled in order to set the debate on a more sound empirical 
footing, and this is the aim of our research. As a starting point, we have estimated nominal rates of 
protection for all tradable goods collected in sorne 400 "products" (roughly corresponding to the 4-
digit SITC elassification) for five benchmark years (1877, 1889, 1897, 1913 and 1926). In a 
companion artiele (Federico-Tena 1998), we have used these data to show that overall protection 
was not that high, except perhaps for a briefspell oftime in the 1890s. We therefore argue that 
welfare losses could not have been that large. In this artiele, we deal mainly with effects oftrade 
policy on the allocation of resources and on the structure of the economy, by computing two sets of 
effective protection rates - a "standard" estimate for sorne 35 sectors in 1913 (or "intensive", 
1 Cf. Tattara 1980 (estimates of nominal and effective rates for sorne class of manufactures in 1913 and 1926) 
Federico 1984 (nominal duties on wheat from 1861 to 1913) and Zamagni 1990 (nominal duties on chemica1 produets 
in various years). 
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Statistical Appendix, tab. B7) and a slightly less conventional estimate of arate for each "product" 
(or "extensive", Statistical Appendix tab.BI-B4) e). We assume that the relative size ofan activity is 
somehow positively related to the extent of effective protection it receives. A protected activity 
would grow in relative terms at the expenses ofless protected ones, or of the production of 
exportables or of non-tradables. Though plausible, and well-rehearsed in economics and economic 
history, this inference is not necessarily true (Corden 1971, Anderson 1994 pp.130-131). For 
instance, protection would not cause growth if the activity needs sorne specific input, such as skilled 
work, whose supply is totally inelastic and cannot be imported. This is admittedly an extreme case, 
but the mobility of inputs and the substitutability between inputs and raw materials do influence the 
extent ofgrowth, ceteris paribus. These effects can be taken into account in a CGE framework. 
Unfortunately, most ofthe historical issues concem specific productions, which are very difficult to 
consider in a CGE model for lack ofdata. Effective rates should be seen as a second best, which 
trades off sorne theoretical accuracy with greater historical detail. 
The next section outlines the history ofItalian trade policy and reviews the debate about it. Section 
three discusses to what extent the historians' opinions are supported by facts - arguing that their 
pick ofwinners and losers is broadly correct, but only within the narrow subset of activities they 
considero So section 4 takes into account the whole imports in order to understand ifthe trade policy 
consistently aimed at fostering industrialization - a sort of revealed preferences approach Actually, 
there is little evidence of any such strategy, or of any consistent strategy at all. So the fifth section 
argues that the lay-out ofItalian duties was the somewhat haphazard outcome of several causes, 
notably the need for revenue and the lobbying by sectional interests. 
2) The Italian trade policy in history and in the Iiterature 
The history of the Italian trade policy resembles very much that of the other main European 
th
,countries e). Protection had a very long tradition, and in the first half ofthe 19 century most states 
ofthe peninsula levied high duties. Actually the level ofprotection has been decreasing everywhere 
since the 1840s, but on the eve ofthe unification ofthe country only Piedmont and Tuscany 
approached free-trade. After 1861, the very liberal Piedmontese tariffwas extended to the whole 
country with a stroke ofpen (an almost unbelievable move in the present world of overcautious trade 
negotiations). Two years later, in 1863, the few remaining duties were abolished by a treaty with 
2 Cf. for aH the detail's on the sources and rnethods Appendix A 
3 The literature in Italian is quite large (cí. Corbino 1931-35 Calderoni 1961 Calzavarini 1966 Prodi 1965-66 Pedone 
1969). In English sorne details provided by Coppa 1970 and Zamagni 1993. For the European experience see Capie 
1994, Bairoch 1989 and Forernan-Peck 1994 
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France. Italy officially remained a free-trade country for about fifieen years, though sorne duties were 
raised for fiscal purposes. Predictably, the industrialists complained loudly, and their requests were 
partially accepted in 1878. The Italian tariffpreceded the German one, which is usually deemed to 
have marked the retum to protection in Europe. The scope ofthe new tariffwas however limited to 
textiles onIy, and so many scholars date the real beginning ofItalian protection to 1887. In that year 
the parliament levied a duty on wheat (which was to be increased three times in the following seven 
years) and approved a new, openly protective, tariff on manufactures. It granted protection mainIy to 
textiles, then the largest industry by number of employees, and to the steel industry. The tariff caused 
a disastrous commercial war with France, then Italy's main trading partner (4) . The war lasted from 
1888 to 1892, when Italy was abolished all the additional duties on French products (France 
followed suit only in 1898). After the defeat, Italy adopted a more conciliatory approach, and 
lowered its duties in two rounds oftreaties with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Switzerland (1892-
93 and 1904-06). Besides, the level of protection was decreasing as price increase reduced the ad 
valorem equivalent of the (specific) duties. A new tariffwas being drafied just when World War 
began. During the war sorne duties were suspended, including that on wheat. The new tariffwas 
enacted in 1921 by royal decree and definitively approved by the Parliament (with reductions) in 
1923. It increased the duties on manufactures such as engineering goods. The duty on wheat was re-
established three years later, in 1925, and this move heralded a massive increase in duties as response 
to the Great Crisis. Since 1935-36, the trade policy aimed explicitly at rendering Italy self-sufficient 
("politica autarchica"), and tariffs were supplemented by quotas and other restriction to trade, ofien 
agreed upon in the framework ofclearing arrangements. The trade was somewhat liberalized in the 
late 1940s, and the protection went down (rather slowly) in the 1950s-1960s as Italy joined the EEC. 
Shortly, Italy remained officially committed to protection throughout all the first, very long, stage of 
its economic growth. 
As said, the trade policy has been always very controversial. The debate has focused (albeit 
somewhat confusedly) on the three main questions: 
- was the strategic choice of protection correct? 
- was the choice of industries correct? 
- did the duty on wheat harm industrialization? 
The wisdom of protection was almost unanimously criticized by economists, at least before the 
1920s (when dissent from the official trade policy became increasingly dangerous). They held that 
Italy would have better exploited its comparative advantage in agriculture ("Italy's coal is our sun") 
4 The war increased protection by slightly more than a percentage point (Federico-Tena 1998 fn.lO), because its 
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or in "natural" industries, ifany C). However, such an uncompromising free-trade stance is no longer 
cornmon among historians. Scholars such as Sapelli (1992) and Zamagni (1981, 1994) stress that 
protected industries did grow in the long-run, and assume that in most cases this growth would not 
have been achieved without protection. They also deem these industries as essential for the long-term 
Italian growth. Therefore they conclude that the advantages of industrial protection outweighed 
whatever short-term losses. 
The majority ofhistorians concedes that sorne protection might have been useful, but object to the 
selection ofindustries. Are (1974) argues that the state should not have made any choice: every 
industry deserved support and should have been given the same (effective) rateo Gerschenkron 
(1962), possibly the most influential author in Italian economic history, states that protecting cotton 
industry (an "old industry with limited possibility oftechnical progress") was pointless and protecting 
the steel industry positively harrnful, because it raised the cost of steel, an essential input for 
engineering. He reckons, however, that protection to engineering and chemicals might have been 
sensible. Fenoaltea goes as far as to argue that, without duties on steel, Italian engineering could 
have started an export-Ied industrialization sixty years before it did so. In a path-breaking article, 
which unfortunately has not been imitated, Toniolo (1977) raises sorne doubts upon the relevance of 
protection to steel. Letting imports free (and subsidizing the domestic industry, the only politically 
feasible altemative to protection) would have doubled the engineering Value Added in 1908 and 
\Íncreased by 40% in 1913, but this would have raised the total GDP by a mere 1-1.5% (while the 
subsidy would have cost a 4% ofstate revenues). The author reckons that "such a policy would not 
have significantly altered the course ofItaly's growth" (1977:671) 
The duty on wheat is less easy to defend. Many historians have pointed out that wheat growing was 
wholly unsuited to Italian resource endowment, and its protection was particularly harrnful to 
industrialization, because it supplied a basic wage good (6). So at best it can be defended as a useful 
short-run device to avoid a potentially devastating crisis in face ofthe grain invasion (Zamagni 1993, 
Federico 1984). 
3) A quantitative review of the historical debate 
'ímpact was muted by the substitution of other suppliers to French ones. 
5 Cf. Cardini 1981 .The definition of "natural industries" was quite vague. Most people thought to the industries 
which used domestic raw materials, such as silk weaving ; some extended the category to industries which cou1d 
balance the disadvantages of foreign raw material with the low cost of labour (like cotton). 
16 Cf. Gerschenkron (1962), Sylos-Labini 1973, Cohen 1979. On top ofit, Fenoaltea (1993) argues that the ensuing 
10ss of potential jobs prevented industty to absorb the increase in agricultural population, who was forced to emigrate. 
In other words, the duty on wheat was the ultimate cause of emigration. 
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As the previous outline shows, the discussion among historians focuses on a handful of products -
the "protected" ones - wheat, sugar, steel goods, textiles (mainly cotton manufactures), and the 
"worthy losers", engineering goods and chemicals. The implicit ranking within this set ofgoods is by 
and large confirmed by the quantitative analysis. According to the "intensive" set of rates (tab. B7 in 
the Appendix), in 1913 the effective protection was very high on sugar (126%), high on steel-
making (74%), substantial for wheat (30%) and textiles (27%). The protection on engineering 
goods was probably about zero, as the sum of a negative protection on rolling stock and ships and a 
marginaHy positive one on other engineering goods. The only departure from the conventional 
wisdom is the case of chemicals, which in 1913 enjoyed a protection not much inferior to textiles. 
Tab.1 reports the "extensive" set ofrates computed as ratios to the average protection rates for the 
five benchmark years 
Tab.l 
rotection on selected 
4.1 17.5 24.4 37.00 3.0 
3.7 4.8 5.3 6.50 2.5 
Na. 3.1 1.5 3.7 5.0 
Na 2.3 4.6 5.2 3.4 
1.6 2.0 2.8 3.9 3.5 
0.5 1.6 2.5 2.6 1.5 
2.7 3.7 3.6 2.3 0.9 
-1.3 2.1 2.9 1.8 2.2 
0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.5 0.7 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.6 
0.0 -0.1 -0.2 1.1 1.9 
0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 1 3 
(a) protection net ofexcise o on sugar for internal consumption (the figure for aH imports, included 
those subject to a drawback, was 13.2) 
Source: Statistical Appendix tab. B8 (weighted averages); excise and duties on sugar Bianchi Tonizzi 
1988 tab. 3 
The historical perspective adds sorne interesting facts. The change in regime of 1887 seems to have 
benefited much more sugar and wheat, Le. the agricultural products, than steel. The protection on 
sugar was unbelievably high: in 1897 the nominal rate was a staggering 314% and the effective one 
466%. Unsurprisingly, Italy had the lowest consumption ofsugar in Europe (with Greece) a mere 
3.9 kg., less than a tenth of UK (Bianchi Tonizzi 1988 tab.2) . ActuaHy, part ofthe rents was 
confiscated by the state, which levied a substantial excise. Rowa) reports the protection rate net of 
excise. Actually, the figures may understate the level of protection in the first years, as there is 
evidence that the excise was largely eluded before 1900. Anyway, even if it was paid in fuH, the 
remaining protection would have been comfortably high. Yet, the domestic production of sugar beet 
started only at the turn ofthe century. So imports dominated the market until the late 1890s and 
._------------------------------------------------
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disappeared only after the 1902 Brussels agreement with other European producing countries. Also 
steel industry was not an instant success, in spite of the substantial protection. The production of pig 
iron did not start before 1902, fifteen years after the first duty, and the production of steel even as 
late as 1913 was small in comparison with the Austrian or Russian one. On top of it, imports, 
especially ofhigh Value Added goods, were stilllarge: the balance for steel goods was still heavily 
passive in the 1920s. On the contrary, in the case ofwheat a rather modest protection was sufficient 
to prop up the domestic output. Imports fell in the 1890s, and grew in the 1900s and 1910s, but so 
did domestic output. The case oftextiles is less clear-cut. As suggested by the common wisdom, 
cotton goods were indeed protected more than the average (even more than steel in 1889 and 1897). 
And, unlike steel, the national producers succeeded in conquering almost entirely the domestic 
market in the late 1880s, and to supply a substantial flow of exports since the 1890s. In the 1920s, 
cotton manufactures became Italy's main export item. Thus the cotton industry might seem a good 
example of successful import substitution strategy - a well-developed infant industry. This very 
success, however, made protection useless. At least in theory, as a competitive industry, the cotton 
firms should have sold their wares at world market price, and therefore, their effective protection 
should have been negative. The remaining protection in 1913 and 1926 refer to a small subset of 
import-competing products (\ The case ofwool is broadly similar, even ifthe industry was less 
successful. On the contrary, linen and manufactures, the most traditional ones in Italy, were hardly 
protected at all. 
As said in the Introduction, chemicals and engineering were neglected in the 1887 tariff and had to 
wait the 1921 one to be protected (slightly) more than the average. Shipbuilding, and the production 
of rolling stock and weapons might have been compensated by the profits on public procurements, 
but the rest ofengineering had to stand foreign competition without the state support. Yet many 
companies survived, and thrived during the booming 1900s. The performance of the chemical 
industry was inuch less brilliant, with the possible exception ofthe production offertilizers, which 
anyway were so bulky as to be almost non-tradables. Zamagni blames the lack of protection for 
attribute this dismal performance, and stresses the "consistency between the protection and the 
growth in output" after the 1921 tariff (1990 p.131). She assumes that high-tech industry as the 
modero chemical one could not have developed without protection. There is however a 
counterexample, the rubber industry. It was surely as technically challenging as most chemical 
productions, and before 1913, protection on it was at best non-existent ifnot negative (tab 1), in 
7 If imports were really negligible, protection (so called watered) would have been negligible as well from an 
economic point ofview. However, imports of cotton manufactures were not totally negligible, accounting for about 
15% of exports in 1926. 
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spite ofthe industries' pleas. Yet it was an outstanding success-story (Bigazzi 1981, Confalonieri 
1982). "Pirelli" was set up in 1872, and soon became a relevant player in the world market for 
cables, and later for tires. On the eve ofItaly was a net exporter of rubber manufactures 
This first, impressionistic, review of the quantitative evidence confirms the conventional wisdom 
about the levels ofprotection, but not (or perhaps not entirely) on its effects, even in the most rough 
post hoc propter hoc framework. Industrial growth and the level ofprotection were indeed related, 
but not so closely: protection helped sorne activities, but was not a recipe for success - nor the lack 
ofit made growth impossible. Shortly, trade policy may have been important for the performance, 
but not as much as usually assumed. 
This conclusion, however, is not only theoretically questionable. It is also too hasty, as it refers to 
a rather small sample ofgoods, which accounted for at most a fifth ofthe total output oftradables in 
1911, and for less than a quarter ofimports (8). What did happen to the other four-fifths oftradable 
output, which included most of agriculture, and well aboye two thirds of industrial VA? In principIe, 
one cannot rule out that trade policy favored sorne other industry And indeed the list of the ten most 
protected "products" (Statistical Appendix tab.B6) provides a lot of surprises. Sugar (gross of 
excise) was at the top in 1897 and third in 1889, but in net terms it was third in 1897 and drop out of 
the top then in 1889. Wheat never makes it into the list, and few steel products appear randomly in 
the second-tier positions. As whole the list is a surprising rag-bag of apparentIy unrelated goods. It 
includes chemical products, such as explosives in 1877, glucose in 1889 and alcohol (another 
product subject to excise) in 1913-1926, textiles such asjute cloths in 1897 and several primary 
products such as raw tobacco (at the top in 1877), fermented beverages and tea. Sorne of these 
goods were not produced in Italy, or were exported, and therefore one might be tempted to dismiss 
this list as an irrelevant statistical oddity. Yet, the exercise shows the need to take into account the 
whole range oftradable goods, in order to pinpoint the strategy behind the Italian trade policy. Ir, of 
course, such a strategy did exist. 
4) The trade policy: a strategy for industrialization? 
Such a vague word as "strategy" can encompass very many features. Here we will deal with three 
questions: 
- was trade policy consistent in through time, or did the relative levels ofeffective protection 
change? And in this latter case, when did they? 
8 Wheat, sugar, steel wool cotton accounted for 12.6% oftotal VA; adding chemicals engineering and rubber the 
figure would rise to 20.5% (data from Federico 1992 and Fenoaltea 1992). 
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4.1 
- did trade policy foster industrialization by favoring manufactures over other products? 
- did trade policy favor a given category ofmanufactures (e.g. consumer goods or labor-intensive..)? 
Graph 1 
Frequency of effective protection distribution rates by number of 
products. Italy 1877-1926 
A) Al! products 
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Graph 1 
Frequency distribution of the effective protection rates by number of 
products, Italy 1877-1926 
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Graph 1 (and Statistical Appendix tab. B5) reports the frequency distribution of effective protection 
rates by number of"products", for the whole trade and for manufactures only e). 
They show sorne substantial changes in the long runo Perhaps the most impressive one is the fall in 
the number of products with negative effective protection, those with zero nominal protection and 
protected inputs. In 1877, they accounted for more than two fifths ofthe total. In 1926 this figure 
halved, and the instances of very negative protection (beyond -20%) , quite frequent in 1889 and 
1897, had almost disappeared. On the other tail ofthe distribution, the number ofproducts with a 
rate in excess of 50% was increasing. On the whole, the distribution has became much more tlat, as 
protection was being extended to a wider range ofgoods. Yet, chi-square tests fail to find significant 
differences at the conventional 5% level between adjoining years, both for all trade and 
manufactures only (with the exception of 1877-1889) eo). The distribution did differ in the long run, 
between 1877 and 1926, for manufactures, but not for all trade. So one can hypothesize that changes 
did occur, but mainly in a incremental way. This interpretation is confirmed by the coefficients of 
correlation by product 
Tab.2 
Correlation coefficients 
Manufactures Total 
.... EtTective nominal EtTective nominal 
0.50 0.53 0.48 0.54 
0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 
0.44 0.48 0.53 0.75 
0.60 0.58 0.61 0.63 
0.09 0.17 0.32 0.51 
As all the rates have been computed with the same input-output tables, all changes in effective 
protection rates retlected changes in nominal rates, caused by trade policy or by movements in 
relative prices - the Italian duties being specific ones (Federico-Tena 1998). We have shown in the 
companion artiele that most of the change in aggregate protection was driven by the modification in 
duties on few primary cornmodities (sugar, coffee etc.). These changes cannot account for the low 
coefficients oftab., which are computed on a very large number of"products". In fact the 
9 The distribution by share oftotal value oftrade in each year (Statistical Appendix tab. ??) is quite similar, and a 
chi-square test fails to reject the null ofthe same distribution. 
10 In both cases the coefficient is significant because in 1877 only one industrial produet (explosives) had an effective 
protection a . bove 500/«O. The c hi-square statlstlcs are 
1877-1889 1889-1897 1897-1913 1913-1926 1877-1926 
AH products 0.58 0.01 0.05 0.38 1.51 
Manufactures 352.22 0.35 0.14 0.91 263.34 
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coefficients for manufactures only are similar or even lower than the total ones. Nor can changes in 
time be accounted for - at least entirely- by the tariffs of 1887 and 1921-23 The coefficients of 
correlation between 1877 and 1889 are indeed quite low, but, at least for manufactures, higher than 
those 1897-1913. And, according to this standard, the impact ofthe 1921-23 tariffwas decidedly 
rather small. Contrary to the cornmon wisdom, the Italian trade policy was featured more by 
continuous change than by dramatic discontinuities. 
4.2 In 1913, the VA-weighted average ofeffective protection rates on manufactures was a mere 
16.9% (Statistical Appendix tab. B7) . The implicit level of protection is substantially lower than the 
one granted by the LDC to their industries in the 1950s and 1960s, at the heyday ofthe ISI (import-
substituting industrialization). The comparable figures in Balassa's classic study (1971 tab. 3.1) 
range from a minimum of26% in Mexico to a maximum of271% in Pakistan. Unfortunately, there 
are very few comprehensive data for the 19th century. The only comparable set refers to Spain, 
where protection for manufactures in 1913 was about 40% (prados-Tena 1994). A less precise, but 
still instructive comparison can be made with the United States in 1904. Hawke (1975) reports 
estimates ofeffective protection for 37 main industrial sectors: in 27 ofthem (Le. in three cases out 
offour), protection exceeded 30%, with a maximum of556% for tin and teme plateo In Italy in 
1913, only 5 out of(somewhat bigger) 30 industries had an effeetive protection over 30%, with a 
«mere" 136.3% as a maximum (for coal and oil refining). And there were six cases of negative 
proteetion, versus 2 only in the United States. To be sure, in Italy in 1913 the nominal protection 
(total and on manufactures) was at an historicallow. But still, even ifit were double (as in 1897), 
the difference with the other countries would be large. 
These data on protection rates supply a very first approximation only, as the allocation of resources 
depends on the relative protection each activity enjoys. By definition, every protected activity would 
attract resources from the production ofnon tradables and of exportables. But there is a competition 
for resources between protected activities. A consistent strategy of industrialization would imply 
either no protection on agriculture (and hence a negative effective protection), as in the United 
States in the 19th century, or at least a substantial bias towards protection on manufactures. In the 
LDC in the 1960s the ratio ofeffective protection on manufactures to primary products ranged from 
a minimum of2.2 in Brasil to 26 in Mexico, and in Pakistan and the Philippines the protection to 
primary products was negative (Balassa 1971). The same ratio in Italy in 1913 (computed with the 
"intensive" set) was a mere 1.45. The bias towards manufactures is not only relatively small: it 
depends crucially on the definition of"industry". The aboye mentioned figure is computed according 
to the standard national accounts, which inelude food and tobacco processing and coal and oil 
----_._-" ------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
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refining in manufacturing. Ifwe follow the GATT c1assification oftrade statistics, and inc1ude these 
sectors among primary products, the ratio drops to 0.8. In other words, agriculture was more 
protected than industry. Any classification is arbitrary by definition, but the latter option makes more 
sense in a backward country like Italy in 1913, where peasants processed a great share oftheir 
products. 
Tab. 4 reports the ratios, computed according to the GATT classification, for aH the five 
benchmark years. As said before, in this case, we have to resort to the 400-odd data by product 
("extensive" set). The two columns refer to two alternative methods ofaggregating them, as a 
unweighted arithmetic average (UEP) or as a import-weighted average (WEP)1l. 
Tab.4 
rotection, industrial roducts 1877-1926 
0.93 
1.43 
1.27 
1.16 
1.72 2.07 
Source: Statistical Appendix, tab. B4 
The results confirm that trade policy was not consistently geared to favoring industry. An 
unmistakable preference for manufactures appears in 1889 and 1926, in alllikelihood as a result of 
the tarifflaws of 1887 and 1921-23. But and in 1877 and (possibly) 1913, the trade policy was 
roughly neutral, and at the heyday ofItalian protectionism in 1897, industry was protected less than 
the primary sector. The figures oftabA (computed with the "extensive" data-set) may overstate the 
preference towards manufacturing, as the 1913 ratio is about 50% higher than the comparable figure 
obtained with the "intensive" rates (0.8). In principIe, the bias might have been as large in other 
years, and there would not have been any preference at all for manufactures in the Italian trade policy 
before the 1920s. Unfortunately there is no way to test this hypothesis, as we can compute 
"intensive" rates for 1913 only. 
4.3 Last but not least, let's consider whether trad~ policy did favor consistently sorne broad category 
of manufactures. Tab. 5 reports the ratios ofeffective rates ("extensive" data) for three pairs of 
goods - investment goods over consumer goods, finished products over semi-manufactures or labor 
intensive goods over capital-intensive ones 
Tab.S 
11 effor a discussion on the optimal weighting methods Federico-Tena 1998 
12 
UEP WEP WEP 
1.33 3.57 2.68 
1.4 2.34 1.47 
0.85 2.47 0.64 
1.53 2.77 1.00 
1.20 2.79 1.42 
Italian trade policy was consistent in protecting consumer goods more than investment goods - just 
because that latter category consisted of mainly engineering goods. The strategy on the two other 
pairs is not so clear, even ifthere is sorne preference for capital intensive goods over labor intensive 
ones. This choice is inconsistent with a well designed infant-industry strategy, which should target 
the industries most suited to the input endowment ofthe country, and there is little doubt that in Italy 
the abundant inputs was (unskilled) labor. The same perverse "principIe" was applied in agriculture, 
by protecting the land-intensive wheat-growing. 
4.4 Summing up, the data shows that i) the trade policy was not very consistent in time; ii) 
protection for manufactures was low and sometimes inferior to that on agricultural products; and iii) 
the policy towards industrial goods was not inspired by any consistent principIe (such as a preference 
for consumer goods, or finished products or labor intensive goods). Shortly, the data do not suggest 
any clear strategy for Italian protection; a fortiori trade policy did not aim consistently at fostering 
industrialization. This conclusion is supported by the results ofa CGE model for 1911 (Federico and 
O'Rourke 1998). Free trade would have caused the gross output of"military-industrial complex" 
(steel-making, shipbuilding etc.) to fall, but by 15% only - much less than one would have expected. 
And it would have caused the production ofall other industries to grow. Textiles would have 
enjoyed a export boom, and increased its output by a third, and the overall manufacturing output 
would have grown by 5%. 
5) Why protection ? 
The causes oftrade policy have inspired a debate at least as lively as that on its effects. A 
burgeoning "theoretical" literature, coming from different disciplines - economics, sociology, 
political sciece etc. (Riezman-Wilson 1995) -provides a lot of suggestions and hypotheses, which 
have been picked up by historians such as Rogowski (1989). The literature on Italy is indeed sizable, 
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even if 0.0 the whole the issue is much less controversial than the effects of trade policy. However, 
the available historical accounts (Sereni 1966, Pegorari 1989, Del Vecchio 1978) are seldom, if ever, 
inspired by any sort oftheoretical framework. Therefore they provide raw material for a still-to-be-
written history ofthe Italian trade policy. Such a task cannot be tackled here: we will only put 
forward sorne very general statements, relying mainly 0.0 the actuallay-outs of duties- a sort of 
revealed preference approach. 
The trade policy of a country can be inspired by four reasons 
- international relations 
- specific interests 
- need for fiscal revenue. 
- independent decisions by the government 
The first heading ineludes aH the interactions with foreign countries - from the "hegemonic" 
theories ofthe general orientation oftrade policy to the more down-to-earth effects of international 
negotiations, which of course could fail and cause trade wars. The specific interests can determine 
trade policy in two ways, according to the institutional framework (Verdier 1994) and to the mobility 
of inputs. Trade policy can be the outcome of a logrolling process between different lobbies in a 
cozy parliamentary environment or can be decided in a elash between big parties representing the 
owners offactors ofproductions (workers, capitalists, landowners etc.). The need for fiscal revenue 
is self evident, while the independent decisions by the governments is a residual category, which 
ineludes aH the decisions aHegedly taken in order to reach any set social and economic goal , such as 
the increase in per capite income, the equilibrium ofthe balance ofpayments, the redistribution of 
income, the build-up ofthe military might ofthe country. Hard line political scientists might doubt of 
the very existence of such thing as an "independent government", but the case cannot be dismissed 
altogether, especiaHy in authoritarian regimes (like Italy during Fascist years). 
Neither the international relations nor the independent decisions ofgovernments seem to have 
mattered a great deal in the Italian experience. Italy was not forced by "unequal" treaties to keep 
duties low as Japan unti11899. 0.0 the contrary, it can be argued that Italy's pretension to be a 
great power played a non-negligible role in shaping its aggressive trade policy in the 1880s which 
led to the trade war with France. Ofcourse, the trade treaties, which usually ineluded the clause of 
the most favored nation) constrained Italy's choices. For instance, the treaties with Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland set the duties 0.0 chemicals and engineering goods. These constraints were 
however accepted by the Italian negotiators, in exchange ofconcessions 0.0 other goods. If the 
Italian government had reaHy wanted to protect these industries, it could have instructed its 
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representative to strike a different deal, or to break down negotiations, as Crispi did in 1888. It is 
really difficult to argue that a "benign" government tried to foster industrialization. As said 
previously, this hypothesis can be safely ruled out for industry as a whole, and also for promising 
"infant industries". The only likely instance of such a policy seems the protection of steel products in 
the early 1880s. At that time, the industry was very small and backward, and unable to organize any 
serious lobbying, as it did latero But it could put forward a strong political argument for protection: 
the steel industry was deemed indispensable by the army and navy for Italy' s growing imperialistic 
ambitions. In fact the government very actively supported the growth of"Terni", a firm specialized 
2in the production ofhigh-quality steel e). 
The political institution of"liberal" Italy (i.e. before the rise to power ofFascism 1922) seem an 
ideal hotbed for the compromises among lobbies envisaged by the political economy approach. By 
Iaw, each single duty had to be approved by the Parliament. For most ofthe period, the suffrage 
was restricted to a minority of male population and there were no established political parties until 
the war (13). And indeed since the Unification the industrialists tried hard to put forward their 
request for protection, against the then prevailing free-trade orthodoxy, which suited well the 
landowners' interests (Are 1966). The movement was led by textile industry, the most advanced 
one: the undisputed leader was ARossi, owner of the largest Italian wool firm, who set up a network 
of organizations by industry (Avagliano 1970). The tariff of 1878 was only a partial success. The 
great opportunity was the agrarian crisis of the 1880s. In contrast with the industry's own apparent 
interests, Rossi strongly supported the duty on wheat, as he reckoned that a Parliament still 
dominated by landowners would have approved a tariff on manufactures only within a generalized 
return to protection. Actually, landowners themselves were far from compact behind the protection 
4to wheat-growing (Musella 1984, Malatesta 1989, Lupo 1990) e). Anyway, Rossi's strategy was 
successful, and the twin decision of 1887 beget an "industrial-agrarian coalition" (Sereni?), similar to 
the famous German "empire of rye and iron". And later, the strength of sectorial interests grew in 
parallel with the size of the protected industries. Giretti (1905), the most ardent free trade agitator 
(and himselfowner ofa silk-mill), cursed sugar processing and steel-making alongside wheat-
growing as the three "trivellatori" (bloodsuckers). In the 1900s the sugar companies set up a well-
12 The support had its drawbacks as well. The government insisted on locating the plant in Terni - a small city in 
Umbria, very far from the consumption markets and the sea. The choice was inspired by purely milítary concerns 
(Bonelli 1975) 
13 The male universal suffrage was granted in 1912; the first "modern" polítical party, the Socialist one, had been 
establíshed in 1892, but its polítical collocation kept it out of the power. 
14 Interestingly, the results ofthe CGE moclel support the cool-headed approach ofthe minority against the 
extravagant statements of the protectionist propaganda. Free-trade in 1911 would not have hit landowners so much, 
provided that land was mobile across sectors. 
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organized cartel with good connections abroad (Bianchi Tonizzi 1988), and also the steel industry 
became large and politically powerful. Its influence peaked during World War One, when it 
succeeded in steering the conclusions of the official commission for a new tariff towards a very 
strong increase in duties with limitation to the government freedom of reducing them in trade 
treaties (Bientinesi, forthcoming). By the way, the post-war crisis of steel-making lessened the power 
of steellobby so much that the government and parliament watered down almost entirely the 
commission's proposals. So, there is a lot ofevidence for a political economy approach. 
However, this approach is clearly insufficient to account for the lay-out ofItalian duties 
without taking into account the fiscal side of the issue. Import duties have always been an important 
source ofrevenues for a state ofien in a parlous financial conditions. Until the late1880s, custom 
revenues accounted for 5% to 8% oftotal. In the next decade, the custom revenues increased 
fourfold and their share oftotal revenues to double. Actually, between a half and two third oftotal 
custom revenues were yielded by four products only - wheat, sugar, coffee and oil. The boom in 
custom receipts in the 1880s was brought about by a series of massive increases in the duties on 
these goods (the last one being the duty on wheat), which did not affect imports substantially, as-
presumably- the demand elasticity for them was quite low. This increase accounted for about three 
quarters ofthe rise in total protection from 1877 to 1897 (Federico-Tena 1998 tab.1). At least the 
duties on oil and coffee (and one might add other colonial goods, such as tea) were undoubtedly 
fiscal ones. These goods were not produced in Italy, nor they could be substituted by other domestic 
products. The better substitute for oil was another imported (duty-free) cornmodity, coal, while local 
substitutes (firewood, water power) were quite remote. Similarly, the closest local substitute for 
colonial beverages was the coffee made with barley- hardly a thriving and politically powerful 
industry. Of course, the case was different for sugar and wheat. Yet the duty on raw sugar was 
imposed in the 1870s-1880s when the domestic production of sugar-beet was still negligible, even if 
there was a substantial refining industry, which clamored for protection (Bianchi Tonizzi 1988). 
Even the duty on wheat had a fiscal component. As early as 1866, when Italy was committed to free-
trade, wheat was subject to a "fiscal" duty and"weighting tax", which jointly amounted to about 3-
4% of import price. And the increases, which more than doubled the nominal duty on wheat from 
1887 to 1894, were included - some-one might say to disguise them- into fiscal laws ("decreti 
catenaccio") aimed at balancing the budget (Marongiu 1995-96 and Parravicini 1958). 
-·--------- 0 _ 
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(6) Conclusion 
The results of our work are not totally at odds with the conventional wisdom. 
Protectionism did favor few industries, such as steel-making and harmed others, as engineering, and 
1t benefited wheat-growing over the production ofagricultural exportables. But these facts regard a 
very narrow set of goods: they have to be framed into the wider picture of the whole trade not to 
~give a distorted picture ofItalian trade policy. The protected sectors were neither the most dynamic 
nor the largest ones. Looking at the whole lay-out of protection and at its evolution, there is very 
little, if any, evidence of a policy to support industry as a whole. The total effective protection on 
manufactures was rather low, and did not exceed substantially that on primary products. Therefore, 
industry as a whole was not given an artificial advantage over other import-competing activities in 
the allocation of resources. Duties on each single product varied a lot over time, and there was no 
consistent strategy to favor any broad category industry over others - apart perhaps from a small 
;preference for consumption goods over investment goods. So, as a first approximation, one would 
not expect big effects on the overall structure of the economy or on the growth rates of large 
sectors. It would be very hard as well to infer from the data that trade policy was inspired by the aim 
at fostering industrialization. In the last section ofthe paper, we tentatively argue that the lay-out 
was the outcome of two different causes - the pressure of sectorial interests and the need for 
revenue. The former inspired mainly the return to protection in the 1880s, when industrialists piggy-
hacked on the landowners' fear for cheap imported grain. The pressing fiscal needs motivated many 
piecemeal rises in duties on commodities like oil, sugar and, to sorne extent even wheat - which 
provided most of the custom revenue. 
By its nature, a strictly quantitative work cannot address all relevant issues. Ours is no exception. 
One ofthe items in the list at the beginning ofthe paper, the effects on the returns to factors, can be 
dealt with in a CGE framework (Federico-O' Rourke 1998). The causes ofprotection should be 
researched in depth: we still know very little about the lobbying, and the sensitivity ofItalian 
decision-rnakers to their efforts. Last but not least, one should try to compare Italy with other 
European countries. Sorne features, such as the low overall protection, the low protection to 
industrial goods, and the importance of state needs for revenue, rnight hold true in other countries as 
well. But this statement should be tested.. 
------------------------------------------------------.  
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Appendix 
A) Sources and methods 
. The Italian trade data are conveniently reported by the Movimento Cornmerciale del Regno 
d'Italia, an yearly statistics published by the Ministero delle Finanze. Its c1assification has been 
changing all over the period to include the new products and to adjust itselfto the ever-growing 
complexity ofthe custom tariffs. The number ofitems grew from few hundreds in 1877 to nearly 
2500 in 1926, and therefore the sheer size of the task has suggested to take into account five 
benchmarks years - 1877, 1889, 1897, 1913 and 1926. AH items have been pooled together in sorne 
400 3- and 4-digit SITC (United nations 1985) aggregates (henceforth "products"), which have been 
used for all the computations. In this process sorne information have been lost (e.g. the differences 
between the protection of different counts of cotton yams) and sorne "products" may be not 
perfectly comparable through time as they may consist ofdifferent goods. Moreover, a substantial 
number of "products" are missing in earlier years, either because they simply did not exist (like cars) 
or because the classification of trade statistics was still not sophisticated enough. For each "product" 
. 
the nominal tariff rate is obtained ex-post as a ratio of custom revenues to the total value of imports. 
The tariff rates on inputs (according to the c1assification in the 1-0 tables) are obtained as trade-
weighted averages of rates for the products which each input consist of. C\ 
The effective protection is computed as 
EP= [T¡- ¿ aij Tj ] / [l-¿a¡j ] 
where T is the nominal duty, j refers to inputs and aij are the technical coefficients ofthe input-
output tableo This is the so called Balassa method, which is less precise but also less computational 
burdensome than the altemative Corden one (Greenaway-Milner 1993). Usually it yields somewhat 
higher figures, but the difference is small- and anyway the poor quality ofthe 1-0 data makes the 
additional precision illusory. 
The only available historical table (Vitali 1992) is unfortunately rather small -a mere 35 sectors, 26 
ofwhich in tradables. The corresponding rates of effective protection are reported in table B7 ofthe 
Statistical Appendix ("intensive" set). The results are still not detailed enough to address many 
issues. So as a second (or, better, third) best we will compute arate for each "product" ("extensive" 
set, Statistical Appendix tables Bl-B3). The product is assumed to share the technical coefficients 
for the sector to which it belongs, such as "metalworking" for all the thirteen steel "products". We 
use three different input-output tables, by Vitali (1992), Cao-Piona (1952) and Thomas (1985). 
\5 A test with simple averages shows that the difference was negligible 
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This latter is the wel1-known table for the United Kingdom in 1907, which ineludes 41 sectors (36) 
tradables, while the V.Cao-Pinna's table considers 56 branches (51 tradables). None ofthese table is 
ideal.. The 1911 Italian table is the closest in time, and to the actuallevel ofdevelopment (both Italy 
ln 1950 and UK in 1907 were much more developed then Italy in any of the five benchmark years 
(16)), but it is smal1. The British table is larger, and it recommends itself as being elose to the free-
trade situation, but it refers to a very differently endowed country (1 7). Final1y, the Italian 1950 
table is the largest, but is also quite distant in time, and therefore, the underlying technology may 
nave been substantial1y different (it relies largely on the technical coefficients of the 1937-39 
industrial census). Luckily, the results do not differ very much as shown by tab. Al, which reports 
the coefficients ofcorrelation among rates in the same year according to the three tables 
Tab. Al 
I f b twe tli f I t tf d" ' s input-output tables t 
1907-11 1911-50 1950-07 
0.824 0.783 0.841 
0.935 0.866 0.877 
0.916 0.707 0.741 
0.869 0.838 0.870 
0.911 0.766 0.817 
Source: see text 
Therefore, while in the Statistical Appendix we present a separate table for each input-output table, 
in the text we use an average of the three. Anyway, we have to warn that statements on the effective 
protection for any single "product" have to be taken with sorne caution. 
16 According to the most recent estimates (Maddison 1995 tab.D-la) the (pPP-adjusted) Italian per-capita GDP was 
1461 (1990) US dollars in 1877, 1544 in 1889,1511 in 1897,2507 in 1913, 2862 in 1926, and 3423 in 1950while it 
was of 4784 dollars in UK in 1907. 
J7 The most striking example is the sector "tobacco". Purchases from "agriculture" accounted for 47% of its sales 
according to the Italian 1911 table, and were nil in the 1907 British one. 
""""-"--------- -----------------------------------"---
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B) STATISTlCAL APPENDIX 
Effi f t f bl 
Table B1. 
GATT I 'fi f It I 1950' 
ca_.e
.•. . ... -
1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 
1 PRIMARY GOOOS 12.6 16.3 14.5 25.6 20.9 13.5 21.9 24.9 9.5 14.9 
1.1 Foodstuffs 
1.2 Raw materiais 
1.3 Minerals 
1.4 Fuels 
1.5 Non ferrous metals 
20.3 
14.9 
-2.8 
33.6 
4.2 
30.0 
-7.9 
0.3 
84.0 
3.6 
26.8 
-7.8 
-3.3 
44.7 
15.3 
49.6 
-5.8 
-1.7 
26.0 
3.2 
36.8 
-4.2 
-0.7 
43.5 
8.9 
24.3 
-1.6 
-5.1 
23.8 
2.3 
43.8 
-10.7 
4.5 
25.9 
16.1 
69.7 
-9.6 
-6.2 
27.1 
1.6 
38.6 26.6 
-10.5 -4.7 
-4.6 -15.7 
3.9 41.3 
-2.1 0.8 
2 SEMI-MANUFACTURES 15.0 36.0 24.4 36.6 48.0 15.4 25.1 10.8 20.9 10.8 
2.1 Iron and steel 
2.2 Chemicals 
2.30thers 
10.1 
23.2 
9.3 
63.1 
40.5 
24.7 
70.2 
13.5 
24.5 
66.1 
43.3 
22.6 
74.3 
49.8 
38.3 
15.8 
6.7 
8.9 
30.2 
-3.5 
20.4 
44.8 
-6.5 
18.1 
38.1 
12.9 
8.3 
53.6 
32.7 
11.5 
3 MANUFACTURES 12.8 28.9 32.9 25.1 39.6 22.6 45.2 28.4 16.5 29.3 
3.1 Eouipment 200ds 7.0 21.3 14.6 14.3 32.1 4.8 16.5 8.3 6.0 8.3 
3.1.1 Machinery 
3.1.2 Office eouipment 
3.1.3 Road vehicles 
3.1.4 Other eouipment 200ds 
3.1.5 Other durable consumer 
200ds 
3.3 
8.3 
4.5 
6.7 
27.7 
52.8 
3.3 
20.7 
14.8 
18.0 
16.2 
2.4 
-6.9 
20.4 
18.7 
20.1 
16.0 
21.4 
73.2 
38.3 
18.9 
2.0 
0.0 
0.0 
10.2 
0.0 
3.7 
0.0 
6.7 
23.4 
52.8 
3.4 
20.7 
13.4 
13.7 
-3.4 
4.2 
-6.9 
11.0 
6.6 
8.1 
15.8 
21.4 
56.8 
31.1 
4.7 
3.2 Consumer 200ds 16.9 37.1 47.4 34.5 47.2 24.8 56.7 39.2 28.4 39.2 
3.2.1 Textiles 
3.2.2 Clothin2 
3.2.30ther 
18.7 
25.4 
9.7 
35.2 
89.9 
33.8 
65.1 
79.2 
22.1 
48.5 
43.3 
18.0 
54.0 
59.8 
37.1 
25.6 
29.0 
10.4 
58.1 
89.9 
34.0 
47.4 
48.6 
13.8 
37.4 
33.4 
14.8 
33.8 
59.5 
39.2 
TOTAL 
OS 
13.4 
34.1 
24.6 
78.4 
22.7 
74.1 
28.2 
57.3 
33.2 
52.7 
15.8 25.5 23.6 11.2 17.9 
other foodstuffs * 
other primarv products 
16.5 
1.6 
8.9 
-4.2 
12.9 
-2.5 
37.6 
-2.9 
21.1 
-0.4 
9.2 
-1.2 
-1.5 
-8.1 
8.6 
-8.9 
19.5 
-9.2 
4.9 
-5.1 
Industrial products 
OS 
14.2 
36.9 
33.0 
73.6 
29.0 
43.0 
30.1 
49.3 
43.1 
49.8 
19.5 
0.0 
34.4 
0.0 
20.5 
0.0 
15.0 
0.0 
27.5 
0.0 
non industrial 200ds 12.6 16.3 14.5 25.6 20.9 13.5 21.9 24.9 9.5 14.9 
*without 04,06 and 07 
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Tab. B2 
Effective protection, GATT classification, ltaIy 1911 input-output table 
Unweighted data Weighted 
data 
1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 
1 PRIMARY GOODS 8.7 17.1 17.9 19.3 13.6 7.0 15.2 21.5 11.5 14.5 
1.1 Foodstuffs 17.2 25.7 27.2 27.2 16.0 11.2 21.6 45.7 25.2 17.6 
1.2 Raw materiaIs 10.6 -1.0 -3.7 -3.5 -2.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.9 -1.6 -2.2 
1.3 Minerals -0.4 3.6 0.5 0.6 1.1 -0.2 12.1 5.2 4.0 0.1 
1.4 Fuels 33.3 124.0 102.9 107.6 115.5 23.8 31.3 37.4 18.2 52.5 
1.5 Non ferrous metals -9.6 3.8 7.6 10.1 4.0 -11.6 16.9 -6.8 3.5 -4.5 
2 SEMI-MANUFACTURES 6.3 24.0 14.2 27.7 34.1 5.8 25.4 6.1 21.3 6.1 
2.1 Iron and steel 7.1 66.0 76.9 82.6 76.9 11.9 38.3 55.5 59.0 59.4 
2.2 Chemicals 11.7 23.8 3.3 30.1 33.3 -5.7 -8.1 -10.4 12.8 24.2 
2.30thers 1.7 13.2 10.0 12.8 22.9 1.4 9.6 4.8 3.0 5.7 
3 MANUFACTURES 4.6 13.9 17.4 16.0 29.1 7.1 18.2 9.8 10.5 23.3 
3.1 Eauipment 200ds 5.4 15.9 12.2 13.1 33.3 3.3 12.3 7.5 8.1 7.5 
3.1.1 Machinerv 2.1 2.9 5.6 4.5 24.4 1.0 2.7 4.6 6.1 23.9 
3.1.2 Office eauipment 19.8 -4.0 30.1 19.8 -4.0 30.1 
3.1.3 Road vehicles 3.8 8.7 14.4 54.6 3.8 7.8 8.7 44.7 
3.1.4 Other eauipment 200ds 6.4 20.8 14.0 16.7 37.4 7.9 17.5 10.8 9.3 32.5 
3.1.5 Other durable consumer 39.6 14.5 18.7 23.1 39.6 0.4 10.0 12.9 
200ds 
3.2 Consumer 200ds 4.1 11.8 21.4 18.6 24.9 7.6 20.6 11.0 13.2 11.0 
3.2.1 Textiles 3.9 4.1 24.3 24.6 25.5 7.9 20.6 11.4 15.9 14.2 
3.2.2 Clothin2 8.4 42.5 37.1 16.1 27.2 10.7 42.5 17.6 9.8 27.0 
3.2.30ther 2.6 21.5 14.0 13.6 23.7 2.5 18.8 8.5 10.0 24.1 
TOTAL 7.2 18.4 16.8 20.3 23.3 6.7 16.2 17.4 11.4 16.4 
DS 44.1 56.0 46.0 42.0 39.7 
other foodstuffs '" 16.8 7.3 10.4 21.1 6.5 0.5 -17.2 3.7 10.9 4.0 
other primary products -3.2 0.8 -0.7 0.3 -0.1 -1.6 1.4 -0.8 -0.7 -2.4 
industrial products 5.7 19.8 15.9 21.1 31.2 6.4 18.6 7.7 11.2 22.3 
DS 35.0 48.2 32.7 35.4 34.8 
non industrial 200ds 8.7 17.1 17.9 19.3 13.6 7.0 15.2 21.5 11.5 14.5 
*without 04,06 and 07 
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Tab.B3 
Effective protection, GATT classification, UK 1907 input-output table 
Unweighted data Weighted data 
1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 
1 PRIMARY GOOOS 7.8 27.4 29.6 19.7 18.9 8.0 24.1 29.1 12.4 14.6 
1.1 Foodstuffs 13.9 44.5 47.2 32.4 28.4 14.7 41.6 67.3 33.4 23.6 
1.2 Raw materials 7.4 -2.4 -2.3 -1.9 -0.9 -3.3 -3.6 -1.7 -2.4 -1.9 
1.3 Minerals -5.9 -0.4 -3.9 -4.3 -3.5 -5.8 9.5 1.6 0.0 -4.7 
1.4 Fuels 30.7 111.3 98.2 52.5 72.5 21.7 29.4 34.6 9.1 35.9 
1.5 Non ferrous metals 4.8 22.2 26.6 12.1 14.8 2.9 34.5 13.2 6.0 6.8 
2 SEMI-MANUFACTURES 8.9 33.0 27.2 28.1 39.4 11.9 41.1 28.8 25.2 28.8 
2.1 Iron and steel 11.1 78.9 91.4 78.4 81.8 16.2 49.6 68.8 53.4 63.4 
2.2 Chemicals 16.7 35.6 20.6 28.2 40.4 5.0 11.5 13.4 17.2 34.5 
2.30thers 1.8 18.3 17.8 16.8 26.5 0.2 14.8 12.5 5.8 8.1 
3 MANUFACTURES 6.2 26.9 27.3 20.0 32.0 9.4 35.9 26.1 15.2 26.4 
3.1 Equipment goods 4.5 26.0 20.3 16.5 33.8 2.3 21.7 14.7 10.5 14.7 
3.1.1 Machinery 1.0 10.3 10.4 6.1 23.5 -0.2 10.0 10.4 7.9 23.5 
3.1.2 Office equipment 29.7 -4.0 29.8 29.7 -4.0 29.8 
3.1.3 Road vehicles 12.8 17.2 18.5 54.5 12.8 16.3 12.5 44.1 
3.1.4 Other eQuipment ~oods 5.6 31.9 23.3 20.7 39.3 7.3 28.0 19.3 11.8 33.4 
3.1.5 Other durable consumer goods 54.9 23.6 22.8 21.5 54.9 6.5 12.6 9.3 
3.2 Consumer ~oods 7.4 27.9 32.9 23.2 30.3 10.3 41.5 32.2 20.5 32.2 
3.2.1 Textiles 8.3 27.8 45.0 31.5 34.5 10.6 42.7 38.8 26.4 22.8 
3.2.2 Clothing 11.7 54.5 47.9 25.1 32.3 13.4 54.5 33.2 20.3 32.1 
3.2.3 Other .4.0 24.7 17.7 14.4 25.7 3.5 23.8 13.1 12.3 27.1 
TOTAL 7.8 28.9 28.3 21.9 27.8 8.5 26.9 27.6 13.2 17.4 
OS 26.1 61.9 51.4 35.8 39.0 
other foodstuffs* 6.4 10.6 13.4 12.8 9.8 2.1 2.5 7.4 9.2 4.9 
other primarv products -0.1 1.9 2.7 0.4 1.7 -2.7 -0.5 -0.8 -1.4 -1.2 
industrial products 7.9 30.4 27.2 23.6 35.1 9.2 33.8 24.2 15.0 26.1 
OS 24.6 41.0 30.1 31.6 33.0 
non industrial goods 7.8 27.4 29.6 19.7 18.9 8.0 24.1 29.1 12.4 14.6 
------------------------------------_._---------
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Tab.B4 
Effective protection, GATT c1assification, average oC the three input-output tables 
Unwcighted data Wcighted data 
1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 
I PRIMARY GOOOS 9.7 20.3 20.7 21.5 17.8 5.0 17.6 24.2 16.3 12.9 
1.1 Foodstuffs 17.1 33.4 33.7 36.4 27.1 8.6 29.2 52.3 42.8 26.6 
1.2 Raw materials U.O -3.8 -4.6 -3.7 -2.5 -1.2 -1.9 -4.4 -4.5 -4.9 
1.3 Minerals -3.0 1.2 -2.2 -1.8 -1.0 -2.0 5.5 3.8 -0.7 -3.1 
1.4 Fuels 32.5 106.4 81.9 62.0 77.2 15.2 28.2 32.6 18.1 30.8 
1.5 Non ferrous metals -0.2 9.9 16.5 8.5 9.2 -2.9 17.9 7.5 3.7 0.1 
2 SEMI-MANUFACTURES 10.1 31.0 21.9 30.8 40.5 5.9 27.3 20.0 19.1 18.6 
2.1 Iron and steel 9.4 69.3 79.5 75.7 77.7 9.4 34.6 51.5 52.4 53.6 
2.2 Chemicals 17.2 33.3 12.5 33.9 41.2 -0.2 3.4 -0.2 7.8 23.9 
2.3 Others 4.3 18.7 17.4 17.4 29.2 0.5 11.1 12.6 9.0 7.4 
3 MANUFACTURES 7.9 23.2 25.9 20.4 33.6 5.5 25.6 27.0 18.0 22.1 
3.1 EQuipment goods 5.6 21.1 15.7 14.6 33.1 1.9 12.9 12.9 9.0 9.4 
3.1.1 Machinery 2.1 5.9 6.4 4.3 21.3 0.3 4.9 6.2 5.8 17.2 
3.1.2 Office eQuipment 0.0 0.0 23.4 -5.0 27.1 0.0 0.0 16.5 4.2 17.7 
3.1.3 Road vehicles 0.0 7.8 13.6 17.8 60.8 0.0 5.5 10.3 11.5 33.3 
3.1.4 Other eQuipment goods 6.8 26.8 18.4 18.7 38.3 5.1 18.6 17.8 11.6 24.2 
3.1.5 Other durable consumer goods 0.0 49.1 18.1 20.5 21.2 0.0 31.5 19.9 6.4 10.1 
3.2 Consumer goods 9.5 25.6 33.9 25.4 34.1 6.0 29.0 33.3 24.3 23.9 
3.2.1 Textiles 10.3 22.4 44.8 34.9 38.0 6.2 29.6 36.1 29.9 24.8 
3.2.2 Clothing 15.2 62.3 54.7 28.2 39.8 8.0 42.0 46.9 26.2 30.8 
3.2.30ther 5.4 26.7 17.9 15.3 28.8 2.0 17.7 18.5 12.0 22.0 
TOTAL 9.5 24.0 22.6 23.5 28.1 5.1 19.6 23.5 16.1 15.0 
OS 34.8 65.4 57.2 45.0 43.8 
other foodstuffs* 13.2 8.9 12.2 23.8 12.5 0.9 -1.8 3.2 9.6 9.5 
other primarv products -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.7 0.4 -1.4 -0.1 -3.2 -3.7 -4.3 
industrial products 9.3 27.7 24.0 24.9 36.5 5.2 24.0 22.1 15.6 21.1 
OS 32.2 54.3 35.3 38.8 39.2 
non industrial goods 9.7 20.3 20.7 21.5 17.8 5.0 17.6 24.2 16.3 12.9 
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Tab. B 5 
Frequency distribution of etTective protection rates 
a) by number of products 
Manufactures Al! products 
Share of products with etTective protection Share of products with etTective protection 
1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 
<-20 2.5% 1.8% 4.3% 3.6% 0.9% 0.9% 
(-20)-(-10) 1.9% 7.5% 4.3% 1.0% 1.0% 2.4% 7.8% 6.0% 0.6% 0.9% 
-10-0 29.8% 10.8% 16.5% 17.1% 5.1% 40.9% 24.2% 27.0% 29.4% 20.4% 
0-10 41.3% 15.8% 17.7% 23.1% 13.3% 32.2% 16.9% 15.7% 19.0% 17.8% 
10-20 12.5% 15.0% 15.2% 18.6% 19.5% 8.7% 12.6% 11.7% 16.9% 15.2% 
20-30 7.7% 12.5% 13.4% 11.1% 15.9% 6.7% 8.2% 10.0% 8.2% 13.4% 
30-40 4.8% 11.7% 9.1% 12.1% 15.9% 3.8% 7.4% 5.7% 7.9% 11.1% 
40-50 1.0% 9.2% 7.3% 4.5% 9.2% 2.4% 4.8% 5.3% 4.4% 6.4% 
50-60 4.2% 5.5% 1.5% 14.9% 1.0% 3.0% 4.3% 1.5% 8.7% 
60-70 4.2% 2.4% 3.0% 4.6% 0.5% 1.7% 1.4% 2.0% 2.3% 
70-80 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 1.5% 0.5% 2.6% 1.4% 1.2% 0.9% 
80-90 1.7% 0.6% 2.0% 2.6% 2.2% 1.1% 1.2% 1.7% 
90-100 1.7% 1.8% 2.0% 1.0% 0.9% 2.1% 2.9% 1.2% 
>100 1.0% 2.5% 3.7% 3.5% 5.1% 1.0% 3.5% 4.6% 4.1% 5.2% 
b) by value 
Share of roducts with etTective rotection roducts with etTective rotection 
1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 
<-20 0.0% 1.8% 5.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.1% 2.7% 0.8% 2.0% 
-20/-10 10.7% 5.5% 13.3% 3.6% 0.2% 4.2% 9.5% 14.8% 1.1% 1.4% 
-10-0 15.5% 10.7% 17.5% 27.4% 16.8% 39.1% 30.6% 31.3% 50.3% 34.7% 
0-10 24.6% 16.0% 18.8% 25.9% 18.5% 23.4% 12.7% 20.7% 15.4% 15.6% 
10-20 14.1% 12.6% 10.4% 13.8% 18.2% 7.1% 7.3% 6.2% 6.5% 5.0% 
20-30 17.3% 5.6% 7.7% 11.2% 17.6% 6.7% 15.6% 3.4% 4.4% 27.2% 
30-40 17.8% 18.7% 6.7% 10.7% 10.2% 14.6% 5.6% 2.2% 14.5% 3.3% 
40-50 0.0% 16.2% 5.5% 3.6% 7.3% 2.8% 5.0% 8.7% 2.0% 2.7% 
50-60 0.0% 0.4% 8.0% 0.0% 3.0% 0.1% 0.2% 3.0% 0.3% 1.1% 
60-70 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 1.4% 2.3% 2.1% 0.1 % 0.1 % 1.5% 1.8% 
70-80 0.0% 2.5% 2.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.3% 
80-90 0.0% 8.6% 0.4% 0.6% 3.0% 0.0% 2.6% 0.4% 0.2% 2.9% 
90-100 0.0% 0.8% 3.3% 1.5% 0.5% 0.0% 0.2% 1.2% 0.8% 0.1% 
>100 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 0.3% 1.3% 0.0% 5.3% 4.8% 2.2% 2.0% 
--------------------------------------------------
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Tab. B 6 
Ten most protected products : effective protection (average of the three tables) 
O/o O/o O/o O/o 
303 519 354 256 
296 466 225 219 
74 325 199 204 
66 253 173 182 
59 185 159 176 
58 112 148 157 
49 111 131 151 
49 103 128 150 
48 100 118 132 
41 95 :5'72'. 110 131 
SITC codes: 0480 Cereal preparations, n.e.s.; 0484 Bread, pastry cakes, biscuits; 0610 Sugar; 0615 
Molasses; 0711 Coffee; 0722 Cocoa; 0741 Tea; 0751 Pepper; 1122 Ferrnented beverages; 1221 Tobacco; 
1223 Tobacco, manufactures, n.e.s.; 3330 Petroleum oils; 3440 Refined oils; 3341 Motor gasoline and other 
light oils; 5113 Petroleum by-products; 5144 Glucose; 5148 Saccharin; 5161 Alcohol; 5417 Alcaloids; 5721 
Explosives and powder; 6545 Jute cloths; 6584 Wool carpets and tapestry; 6589 Other wool manufactures 
n.e.s.; 6591 Lineolum and other floor coverings; 6731 Steel plates; 6747 Tin plates; 6760 Steel bars; 6793 
Steel tubes and pipes; 6842 Copper wires; 7852 Bycicles; 8441 Women cloths. 
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TabB7 
rotection 1911,35 sectors, 
29.1 30.7 5.9 
4.4 4.3 6.9 
12.6 12.8 13.7 
7.2 6.1 12.1 
2.5 1.4 1.1 
65.1 126.0 0.3 
17.8 30.3 3.8 
10.8 22.2 0.1 
12.9 26.9 2.1 
13.2 15.3 1.2 
5.2 -0.7 1.5 
7.7 6.9 1.9 
28.1 74.2 0.3 
11.2 28.3 0.1 
0.1 -10.3 0.1 
0.3 -24.6 0.4 
9.7 7.2 0.5 
1.5 -3.4 0.2 
, 11.9 8.2 3.0 
10.4 12.4 1.3 
11.0 17.9 0.7 
28.1 136.3 0.0 
4.7 -45.2 0.1 
7.7 5.4 0.3 
1.8 -1.4 0.9 
10.3 12.5 0.1 
0.0 -10.3 3.4 
0.0 -1.4 0.9 
0.0 -1.2 12.8 
0.0 -2.2 4.9 
0.0 -1.0 0.6 
0.0 -0.2 1.7 
0.0 -0.9 5.2 
0.0 -3.0 5.5 
0.0 -0.1 6.3 
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Tab. B 8 
Effective protection rates, selected products (average of the three input-output tables) 
lJnweighted Weighted 
1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 
Foodstuffs 
Grain 4.3 29.9 48.1 35.1. 25.9 4.3 29.9 48.1. 35.1. 25.9 
other cereals 1.3 14.6 23.0 11.3 12.5 2.2 11.7 18.7 11.9 6.6 
other cereal products 2.7 17.1 -1.8 88.0 78.1 7.2 -31.0 -153.1 53.4 54.4 
sugar 40.5 325.1 466.3 179.9 49.5 40.5 325.1 466.3 179.9 49.5 
coffee 50.2 112.2 178.8 151.3 90.1 50.2 112.2 178.8 151.3 90.1 
Textiles by fibre 
Cotton 
raw -1.7 -2.3 1.9 -3.7 -1.0 -1.7 -2.3 1.9 -3.7 -1.0 
Iyaros 14.1 44.6 60.8 11.3 2.9 14.1 44.6 60.8 11.3 2.9 
fabrics 31.1 44.9 56.2 22.0 26.1 37.5 72.2 65.3 37.8 22.3 
total manufactures 26.8 44.8 57.3 19.3 20.3 28.3 66.4 64.6 32.2 15.6 
Wool 
raw -2.5 -5.6 -7.3 -6.6 -5.5 -2.5 -5.6 -7.3 -6.6 -5.5 
Iyaros -12.2 10.6 17.0 20.7 89.1 -12.2 10.6 17.0 20.7 89.1 
fabrics 0.6 47.0 66.1 25.3 27.2 0.6 47.0 66.1. 25.3 27.2 
total manufactures -5.8 28.8 41.5 23.0 58.2 -12.1 41.0 56.8 25.0 36.4 
Silk 
raw 0.0 -11.7 -11.8 -8.2 5.8 0.0 -11.7 -11.8 -8.2 5.8 
Iyaros 0.0 -26.0 -25.7 -16.0 -0.8 0.0 -26.0 -25.7 -16.0 -0.8 
fabrics -2.5 17.2 17.1 70.1. 7.9 -2.5 17.2 17.1. 70.1 7.9 
Linen and hemn 
raw -1.7 -3.6 -4.1 -2.9 -3.2 -1.7 -5.4 -8.6 -5.0 -6.8 
Ivaros 1.2 -8.8 0.3 3.6 6.6 1.2 -8.8 0.3 3.6 6.6 
fabrics 6.1. 24.8 82.1 43.5 22.8 12.9 13.5 11.8 15.8 20.3 
total manufactures 6.6 21.8 82.2 44.7 25.1 4.5 -3.4 2.0 7.7 11.1 
Iron and steel 
Scrap -5.5 13.7 41.8 48.4 51.0 -5.5 13.7 41.8 48.4 51.0 
pig iron 0.0 58.6 31.2 47.7 83.4 0.0 58.6 31.2 47.7 83.4 
other products 12.7 69.3 83.6 80.9 79.5 16.2 44.9 90.6 68.0 56.6 
Total 9.4 69.3 79.5 75.7 77.7 9.4 34.6 51.5 52.4 53.6 
Industrial machinery 2.1 5.9 6.4 4.3 21.3 0.3 4.9 6.2 5.8 17.2 
Chemical oroducts 
basic chemiCals -0.7 30.2 0.7 41.6 50.4 -1.0 -8.5 -1l.0 I.:I. 35.9 
refined chemicals 14.6 25.0 18.1 24.4 24.7 5.7 17.1 13.4 23.5 31.5 
Total 17.2 33.3 12.5 33.9 41.2 -0.2 3.4 -0.2 7.8 23.9 
Rubber products 
Raw -8.8 -20.0 -46.1 -27.3 -24.6 -8.8 -20.0 -46.1. -27.3 -24.6 
Intermediate 0.5 6.6 3.8 10.1 18.6 0.3 6.4 5.2 8.8 18.0 
Tvres 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 29.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 29.0 
Total 0.5 6.6 3.8 7.9 23.3 0.3 6.4 5.2 2.5 25.3 
~-~~~---._---- ._-------------------------------------
27 
References 
Anderson, J. 1994. "The theory of protection". Pp. 107-138 in Surveys in Intemational trade, edited 
by D.Greenaway and L.A. Winters. Oxford: Basil B1ackwell. 
Are, G. 1965. Il problema dello svi/uppo industriale nel/'eta del/a Destra. Pisa: Nistri-Lischi 
Are, G. 1974. Al/e origini del/'Italia industriale. Napoli: Guida 
Avagliano, L. 1970. Alessandro Rossi e le origini dell 'Italia industriale. Napoli: Edizioni libreria 
scientifica 
Balassa, B. 1971. The structure oiprotection in developing countries, Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press 
Bairoch, P. 1989. "European trade policy 1815-1915". Pp. 1-160 in The Cambridge economic 
history oi Europe, Vol 8: The industrial economies: the development oi economic and social 
policies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bianchi Tonizzi, E. 1988. "L'industria dello zucchero in Italia dal blocco continentale alla vigilia 
della Grande Guerra (1807-1914)", Annali di Storia dell'impresa. 4: 211-278 
Bientinesi F. forthcoming, "La tariffa del 1921 e gli industriali italiani", mimeo 
Bigazzi, D. 1981. 'Grandi imprese e concentrazione finanziaria', Pp.87-143 in Storia della societa 
italiana, vol. 20° . Milano:Teti. 
Bonelli, F. 1975. Lo svi/uppo di una grande impresa in Italia: la Temi dal1862 al 1884. Torino: 
Einaudi 
Cao-Pinna, V. 1952 "La costruzione del bilancio analitico dell' economia italiana per il 1950". 
L'industria ??: 527-619 
Calderoni, U. 1961. I cento anni della politica doganale italiana. Padova:CEDAM 
Calzavarini, M. 1966 "11 protezionismo industriale e la tariffa doganale del 1887", Clio 2:55-94 
Capie, F. 1994. Tariffs and growth. Some il/ustration jrom the world economy 1850-1914. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press 
Cardini, A. 1981. Stato liberale e protezionismo in Italia. Bologna: 11 Mulino 
Cohen, 1. 1979. "Fascism and agriculture in Italy: policies and consequences", Economic history 
review 32: 70-97 
Confalonieri, A. 1982. Banca ed industria in Italia dalla crisi del 1907 all'agosto 1914, 2 vols. 
Milano:Banca Commerciale Italiana. 
Coppa, F.J. 1970. "The Italian tariff and the conflict between agriculture and industry: the 
cornmercial policy of liberal Italy". Journal oieconomic history:742-769 
Corbino, E. 1931-35. Annali dell'economia italiana, 5 volumes, Ciua di Castello: tipo Leonardo. 
Corden, M. 1971. The theory oiprotection, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Del Vecchio, E. 1978. La via italiana alprotezionismo. Roma: Camera dei Deputati 
Federico, G. 1984. "Commercio dei cereali e dazio sul grano in Italia (1963-1913). Una analisi 
quantitativa", Nuova Rivista Storica, 68:46-108. 
Federico, G., 1992. '11 valore aggiunto dell'agricoltura" Pp 3-103 in I conti economici del/'Italia. 2 
Una stima del valore aggiunto per rami di attivita per i/1911, edited by G.Rey. Bari: Laterza. 
Federico, G. and Tena, A. 1998. "Was Italy a protectionist country?" European Review oiEconomic 
History 2: 73-97 
Federico, G. and O' Rourke, K. 1998 "The impact of 19th century Italian protectionism", paper 
presented to the conference on Long-run economic change in the Mediterranean basin, Istanbul 4-6 
june 1998 
Fenoaltea, S. 1992. "11 valore aggiunto dell'industria". Pp 105-190 in I conti economici dell'Italia. 
2 Una stima del valore aggiunto per rami di attivita per i/ 1911, edited by G.Rey. Bari: Laterza. 
Fenoaltea, S. 1993. "Politica doganale, sviluppo industriale, emigrazione: verso una considerazione 
del dazio sul grano". Rivista di storia economica, n.s. 10:65-77. 
28 
Foreman-Peck, J. 1994. An history o/ the world economy, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf [2nd 
edition] 
Gerschenkron, A. Economic backwardness in historicalperspective, Harvard: Bellknap 
Giretti, E. 1913. I trivellatori della nazione italiana. Roma: Libreria Politica Moderna 
Greenaway D. and Milner, C. 1993. Trade and industrial policy in developing countries, 
Basingstoke-London: Macmillan. 
Hawke, G.R 1975. "The United State tariffand industrial protection in the late nineteenth century", 
Economic history review 28:84-99 
Lupo, S. 1990. "1 proprietari terrieri nel Mezzogiorno". Pp. 105-149 in Storia dell'agricoltura 
italiana in eta contemporanea, vol. 2 Uomini e classi. edited by P.Bevilacqua Venezia:Marsilio 
Maddison, A. 1995. Monitoring the world economy. OECD Paris 
Malatesta, M. 1989. I signori della terra. Milano, F.Angeli 
Marongiu, G. 1995-96. Storia delfisco in Italia, Turin: Einaudi, 2 voll. 
Ministero delle Finanze (yearly). Direzione generale delle gabelle ed imposte indirette, Movimento 
Commerciale del Regno d'Italia, Roma-Firenze 
Musella, L. 1984. Proprieta e politica agraria in Italia (1861-1914). Napoli:Guida 
Parravicini, G. 1958. La politicafiscale e le entrate effettive del regno d'Italia 1860-1890 
Torino:ILTE 
Pedone, A. 1969, "La politica del commercio con l'estero" Pp. 241-259 In Lo svi/uppo economico 
in Italia, vol. 2 edited by G.Fua, Milano F.Angeli 
Pegorari, P. 1989. Il protezionismo impeifetto. Venezia: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti 
Prados de la Escosura, L. and Tena, A. 1994. "Protectionism in Spain 1869-1930", Pp. 63-76 in 
Political economy o/protectionism and commerce, eighteenth-twentieth centuries, edited by 
P.Lindert, J.Nye and J.M. Chevet, Proceedings of Session B-7 of the Eleventh International 
Economic History Congress, Milano: Universita Bocconi 
Prodi, R 1965-66 "11 protezionismo nella politica e nell'industria italiana dalla Unificazione al 
1887". Nuova Rivista Storica. 49: 597-626 and 50:42-86 
Riezman, R and Wilson, J.D. 1995. "Politics and trade policy". Pp. 108-144 in Modern political 
,economy, edited by J.Banks and E.Hanuschek. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Rogowsky R 1989, Commerce and coalition: how trade affects domestic political arrangements. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Rossi, N., Sorgato, A. and Toniolo, G. 1993. "1 conti economici italiani:una ricostruzione statistica", 
Rivista di storia economica, n.s., 10: 1-47. 
Sapelli, G. 1991. "Tecnichal change, micreoconomic evolution and growth: an introductory view of 
Italian economic development". Pp.291-313 in Technology and enterpirse in historical perspective, 
edited by G.Dosi, RGiannetti and P.A. Toninelli, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sereni, E. 1966. Capitalismo e mercato nazionale. Roma: Editori Riuniti. 
Sylos-Labini, P. 1973. Problemi dello svi/uppo economico. Bari Laterza 
Tattara, G. 1980. "Protezione effettiva e sviluppo di alcuni settori dell'industria manifatturiera 
italiana dal 1921 al 1930". Studi economici, 11:82-151. 
Thomas, M. 1984. "An input-ouput aproach to the British economy, 1890-1914" Ph.D thesis 
Oxford. 
Toniolo, G. 1977, Effective protection and industrial growth: the case of Italian engineering. 
Journal o/European economic history. 6: 659-73 
United Nations 1985 "Indices de los productos de la Clasificación Uniforme del Comercio 
Internacional" Informes Estadísticos, serie M, n°. 38/Rev, vol. 1, pp.1-559 Yvol. 11, pp. 1-495. 
Verdier, D. 1994. Democracy andInternational Trade: Britain, France and the United States, 
1860-1990, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Vitali, O. 1992. "Gli impieghi del reddito nell'anno 1911". Pp. 283-337 I conti economici dell'Italia. 
2 Una stima del valore aggiunto per rami di attivita per i/1911, edited by G.Rey. Bari: Laterza. 
29 
Zamagni, V. 1981. Lo stato italiano e 1'economia Firenze: Le Monnier 
Zamagni V. 1990 "L'industria ehimiea in Italia" Pp..69-149 in Monteeatini 1886-1966 Capitoli di 
storia di una grande impresa, edited by F. Amatori and B.Bezza Bologna: II Mulino 
Zamagni,V. 1993. An economic history olItaly, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Zamagni, V. 1994. "Aleune tesi sull'intervento dello stato in una prospettiva di lungo periodo". Pp. 
1S1-160 in 1/progresso economico del/'Italia, edited by P.L Cioeea Bologna: II Mulino 

